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Abstract 
 
 This thesis examines Crimea’s 2014 unilateral declaration of independence and 
subsequent absorption by Russia. It examines the region’s volatile history and attempts to 
present a balanced view of the positions of the main actors involved: Crimeans, Ukraine, 
Russia, Crimea’s Tatar minority, and the international community. It presents a host of 
legal opinions on the issue, trying to answer whether Russia’s annexation of the peninsula 
can be considered legal under international law. 
 Virtually all Western (or at least English-speaking) analysts declare the 2014 
referendum illegal under international law, even though most of them also admit that 
there is no legal precedent to support or overturn such a verdict. This admission brings us 
to the ultimate answer – without a clear legal precedent in international law, Crimea’s 
independence from Ukraine was no more or no less legal than Ukraine’s own 
independence from the Soviet Union twenty-three years prior. 
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I.  
Introduction 
 
 On February 27, 2014, a group of gunmen seized the parliament building of 
Crimea in Simferopol, the capital of the then still autonomous republic of Ukraine, and 
raised a Russian flag. Thus began a series of events culminating in the still-simmering 
war in the East of the country and widespread outrage over the invasion and annexation 
of this Ukrainian territory by Russia. 
 In this thesis, I examine the volatile history of the Crimean peninsula, the 
numerous transfers of power it has experienced, the similar precedents of territorial 
changes around the world, and whether the annexation of Crimea by Russia truly 
represented the will of the Crimean population, and whether such annexation can be legal 
under international law. 
 My hypothesis is that such “land transfers” do in fact have a precedent in recent 
history and they may be considered legal in international norms. On the other hand, many 
a land-grab in history has been carried out “in the name of the people,” and this particular 
transfer, even if desired by the majority of the peninsula’s population, does not easily 
pass the test of legality under any norms. 
 In order to comprehend the legality of what has transpired in Crimea, we must 
examine the legal history of events that led to the Russian takeover. During the two 
decades prior to 2014, the peninsula has experienced an arduous struggle for a degree of 
autonomy from Ukraine. Several legal precedents have among other things shed light on 
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the political opinions of the Crimean population. In fact, between 1991 and 1994, 
Crimeans voted in no fewer than four referendums on the political status of their land, 
namely: 
1991 Autonomy Referendum, January 20 
1991 Referendum on the preservation of the USSR, March 17 
1991 Ukrainian Independence Referendum, December 1 
1994 Referendum on Crimean autonomy, March 27 
 At least some of the above contradicted each other, because within the span of 
one year – 1991, the majority of people in Crimea managed to: first demand an autonomy 
within Ukraine, then vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union (which Ukraine was 
still part of), then declare independence from it together with the rest of Ukraine. In 
addition, these votes were eventually followed by: 
2014 Crimean Status Referendum, March 16 
2014 Crimean Application to join Russia, March 17 (next day) 
 There have also been several (contradictory) legal agreements that had set the 
stage for the current conflict: 
1954 Transfer of the peninsula from Russia to Ukraine (within USSR), 
February 19 
1993 Russian Parliament law declaring Sevastopol a Russian city, July 9 
1994 Budapest Memorandum with the subsequent removal of nuclear 
weapons from the Ukrainian territory, December 5 
 The present thesis explains the sources of the present conflict over the peninsula. I 
find that the history surrounding the sovereignty status of this region indicates that the 
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eruption of this conflict should not have been a surprise to anyone who has studied the 
motivations of the people living there. In fact, Crimea, as a prescient analysis suggested 
in 1994, has been a “pot ready to boil”1 and “a political tinderbox”2 for quite some time 
now, ever since Ukraine became independent, to be exact. 
 Can a territory of a sovereign nation democratically vote to become independent 
from the host nation? History is replete with examples of both successes and failures of 
regions trying to gain independence either diplomatically or, more often than not, by 
force. 
 On the other hand, there have been examples of countries breaking up without 
much violence. For example, Czechoslovakia broke in two through a “Velvet Divorce” in 
1993 without conflict. Norway and Sweden parted ways in 1905 without any violence, 
albeit after a period of saber-rattling on both sides. Lastly, it must be mentioned that 
Ukraine itself became independent from Moscow’s rule in 1991, after the USSR 
dissolved without a shot fired (and without its own population consenting to the matter). 
The last case especially highlights the perceived hypocrisy of the Ukrainian position in 
the eyes of Crimeans: having received its own independence from the USSR, Ukraine 
was not willing to grant it to those seeking independence from it. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the legal aspects of the Crimean 
Peninsula’s annexation by Russia in March of 2014. It will try to examine the agreements 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$!N. A. Kellett and Ben Lombardi, Crimea: A Pot Simmering or at the Boil? 
(Ottawa, Canada: Dept. of National Defence Canada, Operational Research and Analysis, 
Directorate of Strategic Analysis, 1994). !
2 Paula J. Dobriansky, “Ukraine: A Question of Survival,” National Interest, no. 
36 (Summer 1994): 65-72. 
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that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union, independence of Ukraine, the subsequent 
struggle of Crimeans for their own autonomy, then independence, and the eventual 
takeover of the peninsula by Putin’s government. I intend to present a non-partisan take 
on the topic. In light of the still ongoing struggle within Ukraine itself, it may be useful to 
examine both sides of the issue in order to understand the motivations of the participants 
and examine the possible outcomes of the conflict. 
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II.  
Historical Background 
 
 The Crimean Peninsula has an area of 10,000 square miles (roughly the size of the 
state of Massachusetts), and occupies a commanding position on the Black Sea. It is this 
position that has drawn so many powers to control it throughout the millennia: the 
Scythians, the Greeks, the Venetians, the Ottoman Turks, the Crimean Tatars, and the 
Russians. Russia came to the possession of the peninsula in 1783, after a series of wars 
with the Ottoman Empire, of which the Crimean Khanate had heretofore been a nominal 
(with a great degree of independence) vassal. The naval base of Sevastopol, which the 
Russians established on the southwestern shore of Crimea, had a dominating position on 
the sea, and was to be fought over in several wars since then. This city, and the naval 
base within it, has held a particularly sensitive significance to the Russians – it is a place 
in which they have invested too much blood and history to give it up easily. 
 Under the Russian rule in the ninteenth century, a steady stream of new settlers 
arrived on the peninsula, and they slowly displaced the Tatar population. In the Russian 
Civil War of 1917-1920, Crimea was one of the last strongholds of the anti-Bolshevik 
forces before they were defeated in 1920. Following the war, the Crimean Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic was created in 1921, and the peninsula remained part of Soviet 
Russia until 1954, while Soviet Ukraine was created as a separate republic within USSR. 
World War Two saw some of the bloodiest battles on the Eastern Front taking place in 
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Crimea. Sevastopol in particular endured a bloody siege in 1941-1942, during which the 
city was virtually destroyed. Following the liberation of the peninsula in 1944, the Soviet 
government accused the Tatar population of having collaborated with the Nazis, and 
deported the entire Tatar population to Central Asia. The Crimean Autonomous Republic 
existed until 1945, when its status was changed to a mere oblast. 
 As for Ukraine, its cultural identity has been shaped by the two powerful 
neighbors that had fought each other to control it: Poland and Russia. These two 
identities are the key to understanding the divide between the East and the West of the 
country. Both sides of the conflict are right in their own way (or at least have a valid 
point), but that is not the real source of tension. The real problem is that Ukraine is for 
many intents and purposes two nations in one: one pro-Western and anti-Russian, the 
other pro-Russian and anti-Western. Both sides claim to be “true” Ukrainians, with 
Westerners often calling the eastern half of Ukraine “Russian” – which is simplistic and 
incorrect. It is true that Easterners are tied to Russia by centuries of common history and 
identity, but they are not “Russians” – they are Russian-speaking Ukrainians with historic 
ties to Moscow. By 2001, according to the Ukrainian Census, ethnic Russians comprised 
only 17.3% of Ukraine’s population,3 and since a significant proportion of those resided 
in Crimea, that percentage has dwindled with the separation of the peninsula from the 
country. 
 Ukraine, like Ireland, has had such a difficult, convoluted history, full of wars, 
famines, and occupations by various foreign powers, and especially partitions, that if one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 2001 Ukrainian Population Census. 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/. 
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were to drive from the West of the country to the East, the traveler would be seriously 
wondering if he or she is still in the same country. In the West, Greek Catholic churches 
predominate, Ukrainian is widely spoken, and architecture is often Baroque. In the east, 
Russian Orthodoxy dominates religious life, onion-domed churches and log huts dot the 
landscape, and most people speak either Russian or Ukrainian dialects similar to Russian. 
 An oft-quoted perception in the West of the country is that the East is so pro-
Russian because it has been settled by ethnic Russians under Imperial Russian, and later 
Soviet rule. This narrative does not stand the test of serious historical research. The 
Eastern, or Left-Bank, Ukraine as it was historically known (because the country’s 
biggest river, Dnieper, which flows south, roughly divides the land along linguistic and 
political preferences) began drifting into the Muscovite orbit in the mid-seventeenth 
century during the Khmelnitsky Uprising, when the rebellious Cossacks enlisted the help 
of the Russian tsar in their fight with Poland. 
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III.  
The Transfer of Crimea to Ukraine 
 
 In 1954, ostensibly to commemorate the three hundredth anniversary of the union 
of the core Ukrainian land with Russia, Nikita Khrushchev, then the leader of the USSR, 
arranged the transfer of the peninsula from the authority of the Russian Federation to the 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Since both were part of the Soviet Union at the time, it meant 
little, in practical terms. For average Crimeans, nothing changed, apart from Ukrainian 
becoming mandatory in the school curriculum overnight. 
 The transfer was obviously not done with the acquiescence of Crimea’s 
population, this being the Soviet Union, run as a one-party dictatorship. As Putin pointed 
out in March of 2014, the opinion of the people who lived there did not factor much into 
this act. Moreover, and this would later become a point of contention between Moscow 
and independent Ukraine, the transfer might or might not have affected the port of 
Sevastopol, the most populous city on the peninsula and a major naval base because: 
The city had a republican subordination (to Moscow), not regional (to Simferopol), and 
was not a part of the Crimean region of Ukraine and was not transferred together with the 
Crimean region. In this regard it should be pointed out that the decree of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of Russia from October 29, 1948 separated the city of Sevastopol in a 
single administrative center and classified it as a city of republican subordination. 
Issuing a resolution ! 1082 on October 29, 1948, the Council of Ministers of the 
[RSFSR] adopted a series of administrative decisions on financial security of Sevastopol 
(it is recognized repealed in accordance with the Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
of the [RSFSR] of April 25, 1968 ! 264).4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Transfer of the Crimean region to Ukraine in 1954: Legal aspects. 
http://www.smucc.us/uploads/3/3/6/8/3368062/_angl_pravovy_aspekt.pdf. 
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 Ukrainian sources contend that the 1978 Constitution of Ukraine lists the city 
among the republic’s administrative units, and its financing came out of Ukrainian 
budget. In reality, the city and the naval base within it remained what was called a 
“closed city” administered by the Ministry of Defense. Whether it was part of Ukraine on 
paper, for all practical purposes it did not fall under the administration of the regional 
government in Simferopol, and thus not under the authority of Ukraine’s communist 
leadership in Kiev. 
 The transfer of the peninsula created several problems that would come to the fore 
later on. The political status of Sevastopol was ambiguous from the start. It was what 
they called a “closed city” – a military base with strictly controlled territory and 
population, subject more to the command of the navy than civilian authorities. Because it 
did not fall under the authority of the regional government, the question of whether it fell 
under the authority of Ukraine’s Soviet government was left in a limbo. 
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IV.  
Legal Events 
 
 Between the end of the Soviet rule in Ukraine and the return of the Crimean 
Peninsula to Moscow’s control, several legal events stand out that shaped the political 
arena for the current crisis. They were: the all-Soviet referendum in which the people 
voted for the preservation of USSR; the Ukrainian independence referendum where the 
majority of Ukraine’s population voted for independence; the Crimean referendum for an 
autonomy within Ukraine; and the Budapest Memorandum, which removed nuclear 
weapons form the Ukrainian territory on the condition of its sovereignty. 
 To the outside observers, the peninsula’s quickie declaration of independence and 
a similarly fast absorption into Russia in 2014 appears as a clear-cut case of a land-grab. 
The crux of the controversy lies in the fact that while much of the world considers the 
2014 Crimean referendum invalid, it was preceded by two others, in 1991 and 1994, in 
which a clear majority of the peninsula’s residents voted for greater autonomy from 
Ukraine, and which the world opinion has not cared to remember, and the Kiev 
government has chosen to ignore. 
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V.  
1991 Crimean Autonomy Referendum 
 
 Crimea’s drive to distance itself from Ukraine began while Ukraine itself was not 
even independent. In the last years of USSR’s existence, ethnic conflicts were breaking 
out throughout the country, in some cases leading to civil wars that would eventually cost 
thousands of lives. Ukraine was spared such tragedy at the time, but did not escape 
separatist sentiment. After four decades of being part of Ukraine, the majority of 
Crimea’s population never identified itself as Ukrainian, Kremlin’s directives 
notwithstanding, so the drive began to organize a referendum and vote on a measure of 
autonomy from Kiev. 
 As a result of the referendum, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine recognized the 
peninsula as being an autonomous republic. “In February 1991 Crimea was granted 
autonomous republic status by the government in Kiev after more than 93% of voters in a 
local referendum held in January 1991 had cast their ballots in favour of autonomy.”5 By 
becoming an “autonomous republic” instead of an “oblast,” a status it held in RSFSR 
before WWII, Crimea acquired (at least on paper) a legal right to choose whether to 
secede from USSR together with the rest of Ukraine, but when Ukrainian independence 
came, it did not exercise this option. This fact adds more weight to the later Ukrainian 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Vicki L. Hesli, “Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: 
Regional Patterns,” Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 1 (1995): 98. 
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claims that had Crimeans desired independence from the start, they should have used this 
instrument to try to achieve it. 
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VI. 
1991 USSR Referendum 
 
 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union itself was on the path to its breakup. The Soviet 
government proposed a referendum on whether the country should be kept whole. This 
referendum, held on March 17, 1991, was to affirm the existence of USSR less than a 
year before it ceased to exist. It was probably the only truly democratic vote in the history 
of a state known from its creation to be undemocratic. It posed a single question before 
the voters: “Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and 
freedom of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?” Several republics 
chose to boycott the referendum (perhaps out of fear of revealing that their populations 
were not as independence-minded as their elites.) In those areas of USSR where the vote 
was held however, the clear majority everywhere voted to stay with the union. 
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VII.  
The Breakup of the USSR 
 
 Entirely contradicting the above, Ukraine’s population voted to become 
independent of USSR on 1 December 1991. In every single region of the country, 
including Crimea, the overwhelming majority (90%) cast their ballot in favor of 
independence. This vote, which seemed to go against the established views of the 
Crimean population, has been a source of puzzle for political analysts ever since. It has 
also presented a powerful argument to the opponents of Crimea’s autonomy – since the 
majority voted for independence from Moscow, they had no business to vote for a “re-
attachment” later on. That the Western part of the country would prefer immediate 
independence from Moscow’s control was not surprising, since these regions were 
forcibly attached to USSR during World War II and had no prior history of living under 
the Kremlin rule. But the support for independence in the Eastern regions of the country, 
where the pro-Russian sentiment ran high, including Crimea, was more puzzling.6 Ian 
Brzezinski suggests that it had an economic explanation. 
Support for independence was strongest in the western provinces, where Ukrainian 
nationalism has its deepest roots. In the more Russified districts in the east, the republic's 
industrial heartland, support for independence was based more on economic calculation – 
there is more food available in Ukraine than in Russia – than on nationalism.7 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Paul Kubicek, “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and 
Legislative Behaviour,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 2 (March 2000): 283. 
7 Ian Brzezinski, “Geopolitical Dimension,” National Interest, no. 27 (Spring 
1992): 49. 
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 According to Lawrence Howard of the New English Review, the real reasons for 
independence had little to do with people’s will. Rather, it came about because the Soviet 
Union itself ended in a political and economic collapse: 
As the 1980s ended, polling in Ukraine did not indicate an overwhelming desire in the 
population to secede from the Soviet Union, with only 20% favoring independence. 
Ukrainian independence came about not because of Ukrainian nationalism and a cohesive 
popular consciousness and struggle leading to revolution, but because of the 
unexpectedly swift economic and political collapse of the USSR, the specter of Soviet 
revanchism as exemplified by the August 1991 coup attempt, and the political 
opportunism of consequential personalities.8 
 
 On December 1, 1991, Ukrainians went to the polls to vote on the independence 
of their nation from the USSR. The clear majority in all twenty-five constituent regions 
of the country, including Crimea, voted to go with an independent Ukraine, although in 
Crimea the majority margin was the smallest of twenty-five. This vote would haunt all 
future attempts by Crimeans to distance themselves from Kiev with some measure of 
autonomy. Although Crimea was the least supportive of Ukrainian independence, a 
majority, 54%, voted in favor. In Sevastopol, the “Russian Hero City” on the peninsula, it 
is surprising to hear in retrospect that support for Ukrainian independence was even 
higher – 57%.9 
 Thus, in 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen newly independent nations, 
and with its dissolution communism and the Cold War came to the end. Outside the new 
sovereign borders of Russia remained some 25 million ethnic Russians, whose treatment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Lawrence A. Howard, “The Historical, Legal, and Political Contexts of the 
Russian Annexation of Crimea,” New English Review, March 2015. 
9 Serhii Plokhy, “The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian Historical 
Mythology,” Journal of Contemporary History 35 (July 2000): 371. 
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by the native governments varied considerably. Ukraine inherited by far the largest 
Russian diaspora in absolute numbers – eleven and a half million (22% of the population 
in 1993.)10 Opinion polls suggested most of them had no plans to return to Russia. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Anthony Hyman, “Russians outside Russia,” World Today 49, no. 11 
(November 1993): 206. 
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VIII.  
1992 
 
 Barely did the newly sovereign Ukraine start celebrating its independence, as the 
post-Soviet Russian legislature began raising the question about its exact borders. 
In late January [of 1992] it voted 166 to 13 to examine the legality of Khrushchev's 
transfer of Crimea to Ukrainian jurisdiction, thereby setting a legislative precedent for 
reviewing the status of western Ukraine (acquired in 1939) and portions of Ukraine's 
northeastern frontier with Russia (drawn in the 1920s). 
 
 Russia was hardly alone in questioning the newly-independent Ukraine’s borders. 
According to Marc Weller of the University of Cambridge, “When Hungary sought to 
strengthen its ties with ethnic Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring states, this was 
strongly resisted by the Council of Europe and other legal bodies.”11 
 Crimeans’ drive to distance the peninsula from Kiev began immediately after 
independence. “Respondents in Crimea, who (…) were initially positive in 1992, have 
also become more displeased and more disposed toward Russia.”12 With Ukraine 
independent, and pro-Moscow sentiment on the peninsula running strong, the Crimean 
Supreme Council decided to put the political future of their land to a vote yet again. In 
March of 1992, the “Republican Movement of Crimea” collected over 200,000 signatures 
in support of an independence referendum. (By law, 180,000 was enough.) Still, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 BBC, “Analysis: Why Russia’s Crimea Move Fails Legal Test,” March 7, 2014. 
12 Paul Kubicek, “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and 
Legislative Behaviour,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 2 (March 2000): 283. 
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politicians chose to pursue a negotiated compromise, a Bill on the Separation of Powers 
between Ukraine and Crimea, to be approved by parliaments on both sides, and which 
effectively granted these parliaments equal status. This Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada 
(Parliament) quickly approved it before submitting to the Parliament of Ukraine.13 Now 
came Ukraine’s turn to debate the issue. Hence the dilemma. Agreeing to grant Crimean 
politicians more power would surely put the peninsula on the path of outright 
independence, but ignoring the wishes of hundreds of thousands of independence- 
minded Crimeans living there was risking another sectarian conflict. Politicians 
witnessed the current ethnic wars throughout the former Soviet Union, such as Karabakh 
and Transdnistria, with thousands of people dead or displaced. They did not wish the 
same fate on Ukraine. According to one lawmaker: “the Crimean issue has been the chief 
concern of the Ukrainian politicians within the last few months. On the one hand, there 
exist no legal grounds for independence of the Crimea, on the other hand, it is hard to 
ignore 300,000 signatures collected to support the referendum for independence.”14 
 Political opinions seemed to advance in two different directions in Kiev and on 
the peninsula. On one hand, Crimeans were emboldened by Ukraine’s conciliatory 
approach to the Bill, and saw it as a green light on the path to outright independence. On 
the other hand, the Ukrainian side believed that granting generous autonomy to the 
peninsula was a compromise that would prevent Crimea’s alienation and separation. The 
Parliament of Ukraine hotly debated every article of the Bill in detail in April of 1992 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The Crimea: Chronicle of Separatism (1992-1995) (Kyiv: Ukrainian Center for 
Independent Political Research, 1996), 8. 
14 The Crimea, 10. 
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with President Kravchuk quickly blocking the issue. Any talk of independence was 
contrary to Ukrainian constitution, which declared the country’s borders to be inviolable. 
Besides, he stated: “There exists yet another important aspect of this problem: on 
December 1, 1991 the majority of electors in Crimea voted for independence of Ukraine 
as a unitary state thus confirming their will to live in Ukraine.”15 
 The Verkhovna Rada of Crimea declared formal independence on May 5 1992, 
conditional on the majority of voters supporting it in a later referendum. Ukraine 
monitored the developing situation closely, and declared the proposed vote (whenever it 
might take place) to be illegal. President Kravchuk said as much to the Crimean leaders 
about it. 
The Crimean Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of independence in early May 1992, 
subject to approval through referendum. In turn, the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme 
Soviet declared Crimea’s actions unconstitutional, a resolution was later adopted (13 May 
1992) by the full body reaffirming the unconstitutionality of the actions from Crimea, and 
the administrative powers of Kravchuk’s presidential envoy in Simferopol were enhanced 
with a new law “On the Representation of the President of Ukraine in the Republic of 
Crimea,”16 
 
 
 At the time, the issue led to a standoff that threatened to escalate into a full-scale 
conflict between the locals and the Kiev authorities, but it was resolved peacefully at the 
last moment. The Bill on the Separation of Powers was renamed “On the Status of 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea” to make it sound less ambiguous. The Ukrainian 
Parliament approved it at the end of April. Crimeans consoled themselves with a policy 
of generous autonomy granted by the central government, while the rest of Ukraine chose 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The Crimea, 12. 
16 Hesli, “Public Support,” 98. 
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to ignore the people for full independence. In the end, both sides chose to exercise sober 
judgment, and preferred a variation on the status quo to acting on extremist impulses and 
escalating the conflict. However, in the long run, this simply meant putting the issue on 
the back burner, and pushing the problem further away into the future. 
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IX.  
The Tatars’ Position 
 
 Caught in the middle of two countries’ territorial dispute was the Tatar minority, 
which inhabited and ruled Crimea for centuries. Theirs was a difficult situation, because 
they were a minority within the region’s population, and had a history of conflict with 
both Ukraine and Russia. Invaded and annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783, the Tatars 
saw their ancestral land steadily settled by the newcomers from both Russia and abroad, 
to the point where their majority status eroded to the point of being a minority. Accused 
of collaboration with the invading Germans during the Second World War, in 1944 the 
Tatar population was rounded up en masse and resettled in Central Asia on the orders of 
Stalin. Although Khrushchev eventually issued amnesty to many victims of Stalin’s 
terror, the Tatars were not included in this policy. They were not able to return to their 
historic homeland until the Soviet Union started breaking up in the late eighties. Given 
such a history of conflicts with both the Russian government and ethnic Russians, Tatars 
tended to side with independent Ukraine, if only by default. When the split between 
Crimea and Ukraine appeared, the Mejlis (Tatar Council) was quick to announce that it 
would not recognize any legislature separating the peninsula from Kiev’s authority.17 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The Crimea, 9. 
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X.  
1994 
 
 Meanwhile, within Crimea itself, vocal activists from the pro-Russian population 
embarked on a series of political maneuvers to distance themselves from Kiev, battling 
for greater autonomy of the peninsula. The widening gap should not have come as a 
surprise to those who cared to monitor this situation. Already in 1994, (just three years 
after Ukraine’s independence) analyst Eugene B. Rumer warned in Foreign Policy 
magazine that: 
The election of secessionist Yuri Meshkov in the presidential election in Crimea 
demonstrated the erosion of popular support for Ukrainian independence in one of the 
country’s crucial regions. Crimea’s complex history and politics make it the region most 
likely to secede from Ukraine.18 
 
 The idea was revived two years later, when a pro-Russian official Yuriy Meshkov 
was elected President of Crimea. A new referendum took place March 27, 1994. Despite 
explicit warnings from Kiev that the Ukrainian government would not recognize the 
results of any such vote, Crimeans went to the polls to decide the political future of their 
land. The ballot offered three questions: 
1. Are you for the restoration of the provision of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Crimea of 6 May 1992 which determines the regulation of mutual relations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Eugene B. Rumer, “Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?” Foreign 
Policy, no. 96 (Autumn 1994): 134. 
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between the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine on the basis of a Treaty of 
Agreements? 
2. Are you for the restoration of the provision of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Crimea of 6 May 1992 that proclaimed the right of citizens of the Republic of 
Crimea to dual citizenship? 
3. Are you for conceding the force of laws to the edicts of the president of the 
Republic of Crimea on questions that are temporarily not regulated by legislation 
of the Republic of Crimea? 
On all three questions, the overwhelming majority (well over 70%) voted “yes.” Facing 
the threat that no independence of Crimea would ever be recognized by Ukraine, the 
option to vote for actual sovereignty was dropped from the ballot shortly before the 
referendum. However, the drive to de facto separate itself from Ukraine was obvious. 
 The Ukrainian government saw the referendum for what it was – a vote on de 
facto, if not de jure, independence. Realizing that Crimea was on the path to formal 
sovereignty, the Kiev powers boldly stepped in just two weeks later, on April 11, and 
simply overturned the results of the referendum by fiat. They abolished both the 
peninsula’s constitution and the post of the Crimean president. The local authorities were 
powerless to do something about it; Meshkov subsequently fled to Russia. The Crimean 
legislature had no choice but to write a new constitution, more amenable to Kiev, which 
the Ukrainian government ratified in 1998. Because the issue of independence was not 
voted on, it created confusion in the later interpretation of the 2014 referendum vote. 
Nevertheless, at the time, this act of the Ukrainian government turned the issue into a 
political time bomb. All of the above referendums are used by both sides of the conflict 
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as justification of their actions, even though the results of these referendums are 
contradictory. 
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XI.  
The Run Up to Crimean Independence 
 
 As Ukrainian living standards steadily declined throughout the two decades, many 
Crimeans looked to Russia where life was not as bad and the economic decline of the 
nineties reversed during Putin’s presidency. At the same time, among the older 
generation, there remained a nostalgia for the Soviet past. On the peninsula, anti-
Ukrainian sentiments reached the point where even speaking Ukrainian in public was 
unacceptable to some. 
 Despite this pro-Russian sentiment, political drive to re-join Russia lay dormant. 
Parties espousing such view won a handful of votes, even though there is no evidence 
that local elections were tampered with by the Kiev government. The electoral history of 
Crimea during twenty-three years as part of Ukraine shows that political forces 
demanding outright independence had minimal success. Pro-independence parties and 
candidates never scored more than a few percent of the vote in the region, and their 
influence on the politics of the peninsula was always marginal. Political elements 
demanding unification with Russia had even less electoral success, even though there is 
zero evidence of Ukrainian government tampering with the vote. The performance of 
pro-Russian political parties was poor.19 
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 Thus, political developments on the peninsula in the two decades prior to 
independence suggest strong pro-Russian bias but no significant legal drive to reunite 
with Russia. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) notes that 
“neither secessionism, nor integration with the Russian Federation, was prevalent on the 
agenda of the Crimean population, or widely supported, prior to Russian military 
intervention”20 Whether these issues were not widely supported because of fear of 
Ukrainian reprisals or were they not prevalent because Kiev would not allow for such 
opinions to surface, remains a subject of debate. Perhaps no one was willing to risk 
violence to advance the Crimean cause, and nobody believed Russia would actively and 
strongly back them up. As for the Crimean Tatars, they had to choose between the two 
sides, and tentatively chose to support Ukraine. 
 A subset of the Crimea issue is the status of Sevastopol. The question of Crimea’s 
status within Ukraine was one thing, but what was the status of Sevastopol itself as part 
of Crimea, and by extension, of the Ukrainian state? In 1948, Sevastopol was given the 
status of "city of republican subordination" which later on, under the Ukrainian rule, 
began to be called “City with special status.” From that point on, the city was effectively 
subordinate to the Soviet, Ministry of Defense, with little interference from the local 
civilian authorities. Although Russia recognized Ukraine’s independence in 1991, 
Sevastopol continued housing scores of Black Sea fleet ships and thousands of Russian 
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servicemen whose loyalty lay with Moscow. The issue of what to do with them was 
debated until 1997, when the two countries signed a Friendship Treaty, dividing the fleet 
and leasing the naval base to Russia for twenty years to be used jointly by the navies of 
both nations. It thus enjoyed the status similar to that of Guantanamo – part of Cuba in 
name only, but for all practical purposes, a US territory. Notably, the treaty allowed 
Russia to keep up to 25,000 troops there, which would play a role in the 2014 Russian 
takeover. 
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XII.  
The Budapest Memorandum 
 
 The cornerstone treaty by which Russia, together with other countries, recognized 
Ukraine’s post-Soviet borders and promised to honor them was the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum on Security Assurances, signed in Hungary on December 5, 1994 by the 
United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The Memorandum, a 1994 agreement 
between the three nuclear powers, stipulated that the signatories would respect Ukrainian 
sovereignty and borders in exchange for the country giving up the Soviet-era nuclear 
weapons then stationed on its territory. Unfortunately, the document was more of an 
“executive agreement” between the leaders of the four nations, rather than a binding 
treaty, meaning it does not specify how to enforce it. The main problem with the 
Memorandum was that the signatories had no obligations vis-à-vis one another to respect 
the sovereignty of Ukraine.  One party could violate the provisions, which Russia did in 
2014, without anyone else being required to respond. In the most extreme case, it 
promised that the parties would seek UN mediation. The document stated that the 
signatories agreed to recognize the existing borders of Ukraine in return for Ukraine 
giving up its nuclear stockpile. The three powers agreed to the following: 
1. Respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty within its existing borders.  
2. Refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine.  
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3. Refrain from using economic pressure on Ukraine in order to influence its 
politics.  
4. Seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to 
Ukraine, “if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object 
of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”  
5. Refrain from the use of nuclear arms against Ukraine.  
6. Consult with one another if questions arise regarding these commitments. 
 There are several problems with this strange and contradictory document. It was 
not supposed to be ratified by any of the signatories, meaning it does not obligate them to 
do anything about it. It does not specify the “assurances” it provides, yet clearly states 
that they fall short of providing military intervention to ensure the integrity of Ukraine’s 
borders. 
 The very fact of Ukraine ever being a nuclear power in the first place is 
questionable. It is true that Ukraine had (ex-Soviet) nuclear silos on its territory, but the 
Ukrainian authorities had neither operational control over them, nor the capability to 
launch the missiles inside those silos. These weapons were operated by Russian (ex-
Soviet) military personnel answerable to Moscow, who did not take orders from the 
newly minted Kiev government. “And when Ukraine publicly suggested it might seek 
operational control, Russia made clear this would constitute an act of war.” 21 
 The Budapest Memorandum is now frequently cited throughout as a proof of 
Russia’s duplicity and untrustworthiness. Except Ukraine, together with Belarus and 
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Kazakhstan, really had little choice in signing the paper. The problem is that this 
agreement was preceded by a far more important document, which much of the world 
agreed to abide by: the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to 
which 189 countries acceded. To muscle one’s way into the “Nuclear Club” would be 
extremely difficult for the newly independent Ukraine seeking friendship with the West. 
Evidently, the West not only did not want a nuclear Ukraine, but did everything to bring 
her into the non-proliferation fold. In fact, the Memorandum itself was devised as a fast 
track political solution to remove these weapons from Ukrainian territory as quickly as 
possible. However, Ukraine was never a nuclear power because it never had possessed 
operational control (launch codes) over the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. 
It’s imperative was how best to pressure Ukraine into prompt ratification of the START I 
Treaty, with the dismantling of all remaining Ukrainian nuclear weapons and an 
accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty soon to follow.22 
 
 As with the Treaty of Versailles, although President Clinton himself signed the 
Budapest Memorandum,23 the United States Congress never ratified it, therefore the 
United States does not feel obligated to do anything about it. In that sense, the 
Memorandum was more of a cover for the obvious reality that no new members of the 
“nuclear club” would be welcomed. 
 Yet all this does not change the fact that Russia signed the agreement and then 
broke it. The Budapest Memorandum might not specify how to enforce it, but it is still a 
legal document that the signatories have agreed to adhere to. If Russia did not see 
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Ukraine’s borders as settled back in the 1990s, then Moscow had no business promising 
to recognize them back then. 
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XIII.  
The Economic Split 
 
 After over two decades of independence, Ukraine remained deeply divided; it was 
a nation with substantial cultural, linguistic, and religious differences between East and 
West,24 which created differences in the politics of the two halves of the country. Not 
only had the two parts spoken different languages, they also voted differently. In the East, 
communists and the pro-Russian Party of Regions, representing interests of the heavy 
industry dominated. Monuments to Lenin and the Red Army remained, Soviet holidays 
still celebrated. In the West, the pro-EU, pro-NATO sentiment was predominant. 
Monuments to the anti-Soviet resistance were being built, and ultra-nationalist rallies 
held. So big was the divide that some extreme voices on both sides were calling for 
splitting the country.25 Adding to the problem was the poor performance of Ukrainian 
economy, which made the two parts drift apart politically even further: 
That the economic crisis has contributed to growing regionalism and polarization is clear 
from the preliminary composition of the new Rada. The center-right Ukraina Democratic 
Coalition, predominantly Kiev- and Western-based, favors Ukraine’s integration into 
European economic structures and the maintenance of a unitary state; the center-left 
Interregional Bloc for Reforms, mostly based in south and eastern Ukraine, advocates 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The New Ukraine: A State of Regions,” Regional & 
Federal Studies 11, no. 3 (2001): 69. Taylor and Francis Online. Published online 8 
September 2010. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714004704?journalCode=frfs20#preview. 
 25 Rudling, “Memories,” 254, Uilleam Blacker, “One Country?” Times Literary 
Supplement, May 9, 2014, 14. 
!!
&&!
Ukraine’s full entry into the CIS’ economic union and supports federal restructuring. The 
results of the referenda held in both Eastern Ukraine (on integration in the CIS economic 
union) and in Crimea (on autonomy from Kiev) flow largely from the population’s 
discontent with current economic conditions and the Ukrainian leadership’s inaction.26 
 
 Compounding the problem of the East/West split is the economic division, not 
unlike the one facing the United States in the run-up to the Civil War, with half the 
country having a predominantly agricultural economy which favored free trade with 
Europe, and the other half with a predominantly industrial economy demanding 
protectionism. The coal-rich Eastern Ukraine began industrializing in the nineteenth 
century and even more rapidly in the 1930s, while the economy of the Western part, as 
part of Poland, remained predominantly agricultural. Because of this discrepancy, the 
industrialized regions contributed disproportionally to the country’s GDP since 
independence, so that the industrial pro-Russian East of the country has been effectively 
subsidizing the agricultural anti-Russian West. 
 The oft-repeated stereotype is that Ukraine, like much of Europe is heavily 
dependent on Russia for its supply of natural gas. What is rarely mentioned is the fact 
that Ukraine does in fact produce some gas and oil of its own. The problem is that much 
of the energy supplied by Russia is in fact used for industrial purposes by the factories in 
the East, which then sell their products back to Russia. “Another key Soviet legacy was 
the extreme interdependence between Ukrainian-based enterprises and factories spread 
throughout the former Soviet Union.”27 Eastern industries were thus more economically 
integrated into Russia than Ukraine’s own Western half. In this economic loop, the 
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Western part of the country, with its European aspirations, was seen as a nuisance.28 
These discrepancies caused not only economic “regionalism” which deepened the split 
between different parts of the country, but threatened to distance them from the center: 
“Each region now seeks its economic fortune independently and threatens to marginalize 
the role of the central government in Kiev.”29 And politics was the product of economics. 
Ukrainian factories are long accustomed to subsidized energy supplies. Politically, it has 
been difficult for [then president] Kravchuk and his Kiev-based colleagues to move 
against powerful regional economic interests, especially in Russian-speaking eastern 
Ukraine which has traditionally enjoyed a close relationship with the neighboring 
Russian provinces.30 
 
 
 In late 2013, probably hoping to repeat the success of the 2004 Orange 
Revolution, which had resulted in a pro-Western president, Victor Yushchenko, elected 
in a close election marred by widespread vote-rigging and fraud, crowds of protesters 
came together on the Independence Square (Maidan) of Ukraine’s capital, Kiev, and 
began a series of protests opposing what the protesters believed were pro-Russian 
policies of the current Ukrainian administration. The president of Ukraine, Victor 
Yanukovich, was a leader by this time deeply unpopular with the people, yet 
democratically elected. 
 The economic dilemma was this: if Ukraine were to enter some sort of free-trade 
agreement with Europe, the factories in the East of the country would go bankrupt, 
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effectively ceasing the need for Russian energy sources (and hitting Russian energy-
exporting giants below the belt.) This would be a perfect solution to the country’s 
problems of energy dependence on Russia, that is, if one does not mind millions of 
people in East Ukraine losing their livelihood, which depends on these factories.31 
 The president’s alleged Russian sympathies triggered the reaction of some 
Ukrainians who saw this as betrayal and contrary to Ukraine’s economic interests. An 
initially peaceful protest soon turned violent, with both the protesters and the government 
accusing each other of using snipers. Scores of people were killed on both sides. In 
February 2014, after the discontent welled up and casualties grew, Yanukovich fled the 
country, and soon after, the Parliamentary majority voted for his removal (bypassing the 
constitutional impeachment procedures).32 Replacing the former president was a 
provisional government whose members were heavily representative of the western, 
Ukrainian-speaking regions of the country.33 After seizing power, the radicals in the Rada 
influenced the parliament to overturn the 2012 Law on Regional Languages, which had 
granted Russian, together with other minority languages (Hungarian, Moldovan, 
Romanian) regional status in the areas where such languages were in use up to a specified 
level. This the parliament duly revoked, albeit with a slim majority (232 votes against the 
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required minimum of 226.) 34  In fact, this was the very first action of the parliament 
under the new administration. 
 Revocation of the law resulted in a backlash. Seeing this as an encroachment on 
their liberties, the Russian-speaking eastern and southern areas of the country erupted in a 
series of their own, often violent protests against the new government. Mindful of the 
danger of the brewing conflict, the acting President Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed the 
action just five days later, but it was too late. In Crimea, a cascade of events culminated 
in the outright declaration of independence from Ukraine. 
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XIV.  
2014 
 
 With the political chaos in Kiev following the Maidan Revolution, the pro-
Russian forces in Crimea decided to act, and organized a third referendum. The full 
content of the ballots was publicized just ten days before the actual referendum, although 
details had been discussed earlier. The ballot gave the voters two options: 
Choice 1: Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia with all the 
rights of the federal subject of the Russian Federation? 
Choice 2: Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Crimea in 1992 and the status of the Crimea as part of Ukraine? 
 Notably, the ballot did not offer the choice of staying part of Ukraine without an 
autonomy. From the Crimean point of view, the second option did not question Ukraine’s 
sovereignty over the peninsula, but rather would overturn the earlier decision of the Kiev 
government to squash the autonomous republic’s constitution – the vote simply restored 
what the people had already voted for two decades prior. Thus, contrary to the established 
view in the West, the 2014 referendum clearly allowed the voters a choice to remain part 
of Ukraine. Some observers questioned whether voting for the second option in fact 
meant remaining with Ukraine, since the original version of the 1992 constitution granted 
the “Crimean Autonomous Republic” such options as the right to establish diplomatic 
relations with other countries – a privilege usually exercised by sovereign nations. If so, 
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the referendum was meaningless, because it did not offer voters any real choice in 
remaining with Ukraine. According to John Balouziyeh “the only available choices to 
those who participated in the referendum were to either join Russia as a federal subject or 
restore the 1992 Crimean constitution, which would grant greater powers to the Crimean 
parliament including the power to establish relations with other states.”35 
 The majority chose union with Russia, although with numerous reports of vote 
falsification. The question remains as to how fair the referendum really was. “The 
referendum was rushed and conducted under great pressure, having been concluded in 
two weeks’ time. In addition, there is evidence that the 97.5% of voters that Russia 
initially claimed opted for secession did not accurately reflect voter turnout. Besides 
irregularities such as a 123% turnout in Sevastopol, a sizeable Crimean Tatar minority 
boycotted the vote. 
 Sevastopol City Council decided to participate in the March 16 referendum with 
an extra question added to the ballot: 
“Shall the city of Sevastopol join the Russian Federation as a subject of the 
Russian Federation?” 
 Earlier, the City Council had declared the city to be independent of Ukraine in a 
joint resolution with the Supreme Council of Crimea on March 11, 2014.36 
 As for the Tatar minority, the leaders of their organizations were quick to side 
with Ukraine. “The spokespersons of the Crimean Tatars declared that their ethnic group 
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had boycotted the referendum of 16 March, and announced that they sought to hold a 
referendum on their ‘political autonomy’ within Crimea.”37 Thus the Tatars’ position 
could be described as cautiously pro-Ukrainian. 
 The Independent Republic of Crimea existed for only one day. On March 17, the 
“republic” appealed to become part of the Russian Federation. Apart from the cultural 
affinity, there was also a clear economic benefit – with the per capita income in Russia 
being three times higher than in Ukraine,38 switching loyalty would boost the region 
financially. Still, behind the application were not only the ethnic or economic reasons; 
there was also a security concern about Ukraine trying to reattach the peninsula by force 
if Crimeans did not immediately appeal to Russian protection. Had they not, they surely 
would have experienced the fate of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Eastern Ukraine, 
which also declared their independence, but never applied to join Russia. In the case of 
the Donbas regions, the Kiev government responded with force and the result was a still-
ongoing war that devastated the area and cost thousands of lives. 
 Most available media sources suggest that the vast majority of people living in 
Crimea itself are supportive of the Russian annexation. Notably, an anonymous telephone 
survey conducted in January of 2015 by a Ukrainian political scientist Taras Berezovets 
with the help of a German market research group GfK, found that “Eighty-two percent of 
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those polled said they fully supported Crimea's inclusion in Russia, and another 11 
percent expressed partial support. Only 4 percent spoke out against it.”39 
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XV.  
Timeline of Events 
 
 The timeline of events in the twenty-three years leading to the peninsula’s 
annexation by Russia is as follows: 
Date Action Notes 
February 
19, 1954 
Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet issued a decree that 
transferred the Crimean Oblast 
from the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic to 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. 
The reason for the transfer, as stated in 
the decree, was "the integral character 
of the economy, the territorial 
proximity and the close economic and 
cultural ties between the Crimea 
Province and the Ukrainian SSR." 
January 20, 
1991 
Referendum to become 
autonomous republic  
February 
12, 1991 
Crimean Autonomous republic 
(ASSR) created 
Autonomous status allowed 
independence from Ukraine. 
December 
26, 1991 USSR dissolves Ukraine becomes independent 
February 
26, 1992 
Crimean parliament renamed 
the ASSR the Republic of 
Crimea 
 
May 5, 
1992 
Supreme Soviet of Crimea 
declares independence, 
conditional depending on the 
results of a later referendum 
Ukraine’s parliament issues Crimea a 
deadline until May 20 to rescind 
independence 
May 19, 
1992 
Crimea agreed to remain part of 
Ukraine and annulled its 
proclamation of self-
government 
“Independence” option dropped from 
the referendum ballot three days later 
October 14, 
1993 
Post of the President of Crimea 
established  
January 30, 
1994 
Yuriy Meshkov elected 
President of Crimea Assumes office February 16 
March 27, 
1994 
Crimean autonomy referendum 
proceeds (without the 
“independence” option) 
Voters were asked whether they were in 
favor of greater autonomy within 
Ukraine, whether residents should have 
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dual Russian and Ukrainian citizenship, 
and whether presidential decrees should 
have the status of laws. All three 
proposals were approved. 
December 
5, 1994 
Russia, US, and the UK sign the 
Budapest Memorandum on 
Security Assurances 
The signatories agreed to recognize the 
existing borders of Ukraine in return 
for Ukraine giving up its nuclear 
stockpile. 
March 17, 
1995 
Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada 
abolishes the May 1992 
Crimean Constitution (and the 
post of President of Crimea) 
Meshkov flees to Russia 
June – 
September, 
1995 
Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kuchma governs Crimea under 
a direct presidential 
administration decree 
 
October 
1995 
The Crimean parliament adopts 
a new Constitution 
Not recognized by the national 
(Ukrainian) authorities until April 1996 
when significant amendments were 
suggested 
May 28, 
1997 
Russia and Ukraine reach an 
agreement on dividing the Black 
Sea Fleet between the two 
countries 
The agreement includes a provision on 
Russia recognizing Ukraine’s existing 
borders 
October 21, 
1998 
A fifth draft law of the October 
1995 constitution was ratified at 
the second session of the 
Crimean parliament 
Constitution confirmed December 23, 
1998 
March 16, 
2014 
Crimean independence 
referendum is held; results in 
the unilateral secession the next 
day 
Crimean parliament requests to join 
Russia March 17. Request approved the 
next day. 
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XVI.  
Opinions on Crimean Independence 
 
 From the Crimeans’ point of view, if Ukraine itself could legally secede from the 
Soviet Union twenty four years ago, why cannot a territory secede from Ukraine itself? 
Crimeans are also mindful of the fact that the West has dismembered Serbia by force two 
decades ago, guaranteeing an ethnic Albanian minority its own state in Kosovo (which 
achieved actual independence in 2008.) 
 The Ukrainian side of the argument is clear: Crimea’s independence and 
subsequent annexation by Russia was a case of conquest, pure and simple, a blatant 
violation of international norms. Although pro-Russian elements have always had a 
strong presence in Ukrainian politics since independence, they were never dominant 
enough to split the country, at least until recently. It is worth noting that the referendums 
of 1991 and 1994 in Crimea demanded a greater autonomy from Kiev, rather than 
outright independence. The clear majority of Crimeans voted for Ukraine’s independence 
from USSR in the 1991 referendum (albeit with the smallest margin among the country’s 
twenty-five regions). This fact means that Crimea willingly joined Ukraine in becoming 
independent from the Soviet Union. 
 Brookings Senior Fellow Fiona Hill argued that Putin’s current policies toward 
Ukraine were really a continuation of those of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who had 
proclaimed the right of Russia to influence the internal politics of the former Soviet 
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republics (what Moscow has termed “the Near Abroad”) – the claim which Putin’s 
administration often continues to repeat. “Yeltsin was hobbled by economic crisis, 
domestic political turmoil, and secessionist conflicts at home, and never able to mount a 
major Russian military intervention.”40 Putin does not face the same problems. 
When the Soviet Union was falling apart because of sovereignty aspirations of its 
various ethnic groups, and the world recognized their right to self-determination, they let 
a very dangerous genie out of the bottle – ethnic nationalism. There were fifteen 
constituent republics, but over a hundred ethnic groups living in USSR. Who’s to decide 
which ethnic groups have a right to self-determination, and which ones don’t? There does 
not seem to be an objective answer to this question. In the midst of the Sudetenland Crisis 
in 1938, a Cambridge linguist and an ardent opponent of appeasement, F. L. Lucas, 
opined thus: 
Many honest folk feel it hard to deny the Sudetens self-determination, if they want to 
belong to the Reich. But then, can we deny it to the Czech areas among the Sudetens? 
Then what about Sudeten pockets in the Czech areas? Self-determination must stop 
somewhere. In politics, as in physics, you come to a point where you cannot go on 
splitting things. You cannot have self-determination by villages.41 
 
 Lea Brilmayer of the Guardian, on the other hand, argues that Russia’s action 
regarding the peninsula is not so much in contradiction to the international law, but rather 
“is based on an outdated theory of secession.” Citing the example of Yugoslavia, 
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Brilmayer presents national self-determination as a recipe for greater ethnic conflict 
rather than a solution to it: “Using principles of self-determination to justify imposing 
ethnic homogeneity has resulted in genocide and ethnic cleansing.”42 
 Charles Krauthammer brings forth the argument that, whatever the desires of the 
people living in Crimea, they are not enough to re-arrange the borders of a sovereign 
state, i.e. Ukraine. Sovereignty trumps people’s aspirations, even if these people have 
become part of that state only recently and against their will. 
It is not all that clear why Crimea should belong to Ukraine in the first place. The 
substantial majority of the population is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously Russian. 
The majority of its population probably prefers to be ruled from Moscow rather than 
Kiev. … 
 So why Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea? The answer: Nikita Khrushchev’s 
caprice. In 1954, the first secretary of the Central Committee detached Crimea from the 
Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and gave it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
He did not consult the Crimeans, but it did not much matter, as everyone was ruled from 
the Kremlin anyway. From that moment on, official internal Soviet borders included 
Crimea in Ukraine. 
 Thus, all Ukraine has for its claim of title to Crimea is a dead dictator’s whim. 
But for international law, that is more than enough.43 
 
 Thus, even a democratic vote is not enough to reverse the decision of a bygone 
authoritarian government. 
 The chorus of condemnation was far from unanimous, however.44 Notably, the  
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older veterans of US foreign policy, like Henry Kissinger45 and Zbignew Brzezinski,46 
were more reserved in their judgment on Ukraine, with the latter suggesting 
“Finlandization” of the country as a neutral alternative between Russia and NATO.47 Jack 
Matlock, who had served as the American ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1987-1991 
was even more blunt in his assessment, calling US a “bully” in its treatment of Russia.48 
Not that Russia’s recent actions regarding it’s “near abroad” could not be predicted. The 
millions of Russians who ended up living in foreign countries overnight were not only a 
cause of ethnic tensions, and as Eugene Rumer had predicted, they were bound to emerge 
as a political card within Russia itself, becoming the “determining factor in any decisions 
by Moscow on a military intervention.” “Even if it wanted to, Russia cannot simply shake 
off responsibility for their welfare, whatever the position may be in international law 
[emphasis is mine.]”49 And in the Crimea case, some in the West warned over twenty 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Henry A. Kissinger, “Henry Kissinger: To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the 
End,” Washington Post, March 5, 2014. 
46 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Zbigniew Brzezinski on ISIS, Ukraine, and the Future of 
American Power,” MSNBC, September 10, 2014. 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/zbigniew-brzezinski-isis-ukraine-and-the-future-
american-power. 
47 Terry Atlas, “Brzezinski Sees Finlandization of Ukraine as Deal Maker,” 
Bloomberg, April 12, 2014. 
48 Jack F. Matlock Jr., “Who Is the Bully? The U.S. Has Treated Russia Like a 
Loser since the End of the Cold War,” Washington Post, March 14, 2014. 
49 Hyman, “Russians Outside Russia,” 205. 
!!
'*!
years prior, that the conflict in this land was almost inevitable: “there may be no 
alternative to Russian intervention in the event of a conflict in Crimea.”50 
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XVII.  
Precedents 
 
 The incident that may have very well set the legal confusion in motion toward 
Crimea was the separation of the province of Kosovo, populated mainly by Kosovar 
Albanians, from effective Serbian control in 1999, and its subsequent declaration of 
independence in 2008. The separation was achieved only after a prolonged bombing of 
Serbia by NATO air forces. The action did not receive UN approval; it was effectively 
carried out at gunpoint by Western governments. The region’s early years of 
independence were largely guaranteed through the presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
on its territory – consisting of NATO and EU troops. 
 According to Chrizella Herzog of the Diplomatic Courier, “at the heart of this 
question over Russia’s actions is a conflict between two of some of the most important 
tenets of international law in the modern era: the right of self-determination, and the 
protection of territorial integrity: 
In 1998, NATO forces, led by the U.S., intervened in the former Yugoslavia to save 
Kosovo from ethnic cleansing by Serbian troops and paramilitaries. NATO did not have 
UN authorization for the intervention, nor for a while did it have any kind of justification 
under international law for its actions. Only later was a justification named, stating that 
the action was “illegal but legitimate” because of its urgent humanitarian purpose. This 
led to the creation of an exception to the use-of-force restrictions under the UN Charter 
that permits humanitarian military interventions without UN authorization in cases of 
urgent and mass human rights violations.51 
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 And it was Putin who called the action “illegal, ill-conceived and immoral” while 
Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s first deputy prime minister at the time, warned that recognition of 
an independent Kosovo by European governments would open a “Pandora's box” of 
hundreds of territories throughout the world seeking independence. According to Putin, 
“Kosovo precedent was a terrible precedent, and that, in fact, it broke the whole system 
of international relations, developed not even during a decade, but over the centuries.”52 
The document has been passed over the heads of the UN Security Council and contrary to 
our persistent recommendations to have it discussed at the Security Council and approved 
by relevant resolutions. We have repeatedly expressed our opposition to the holding of 
the general elections in Kosovo scheduled for November 17 this year. With more than 
300,000 non-Albanian citizens expelled from the province their outcome may be 
practically annulled. In practice, it would lead to legalisation of ethnic cleansing. Let me 
stress that Russia does not object to elections in general. We favour elections. But we 
favour fair elections with the participation of all the groups of the population living in 
this area.53 
 
 The question remains, is the Kosovo “precedent” valid in the case of Crimea, as 
well as in other cases of regions striving for independence, and whether it is even a 
precedent. The answer, again, depends on how you look at it, and who does the looking. 
Given that there are literally hundreds of regions, tribes, and ethnic and religious groups 
on the planet aspiring to sovereign statehood, the question looms large, but there is no 
clear-cut solution. Taiwan, for example, has enjoyed a de facto sovereign status for 
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decades and diplomatic relations with twenty-three nations, yet it’s not a member of the 
UN and not an independent nation in the full meaning of the term. According to Judy Fu 
of the New Statesman: 
All in all, did Kosovo open a Pandora’s Box of unilateral declarations of independence? 
All things considered, no. However, if the international community intends to keep the 
floodgates of secessionist movements closed, it would do well to learn from Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. The international community must move away from black-and-white 
conceptions of statehood – the choice is not between independence and territorial 
integrity. Dare we say, the choice should be to think a little outside the box.54 
 
 René Värk argues that, again, although Russia’s actions in Crimea stretch the 
norms of international law, the ghost of Kosovo has come to haunt Western policy 
makers: 
Is Kosovo a precedent? The Western States tried to argue that Kosovo is a special case 
and does not count as a precedent. But this is a fragile and dangerous argument, both 
politically and legally. What makes the Kosovo case so special that it is not usable as a 
guiding example vis-à-vis other people? What is the message to Kurds, Tibetans and 
Western Saharans? That you are not special enough, you are ordinary and do not deserve 
self-determination? Let us say that Kosovo is not a problem-free case, including the 
NATO bombing campaign in spring 1999.55 
 
 William W. Burke-White of the University of Pennsylvania Law School adds 
that: 
while in 1999 the US was able to control the interpretation and enforcement of 
international law to secure Kosovo’s independence without legal consequence, 
Washington finds itself in 2014 unable to fully counteract Moscow’s legal argument that 
its support for, and ultimate annexation of, Crimea is equally grounded in international 
law. Russia’s ability to exploit the legal ambiguities shared by Crimea and Kosovo arises 
in large part because of the inherent tension between two oft conflicting principles that 
have been at the heart of the international legal and political systems since 1945. The first 
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of these principles is that countries cannot use force against one another and, particularly, 
cannot secure territorial gains through the use of force.56 
 
 Lawrence A. Howard of The New English Review compares the Russian 
intervention in Crimea to US interventions in both Kosovo and Bosnia, and argues that 
the latter two involved much more tampering with the local politics and elections by 
outside force. 
At this writing, the best authority on whether a group or province within an existing state 
has a right under international law to self-determine it is the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice as to the Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo. In that opinion, the court 
evaded the issue of whether the right of self-determination confers upon a population of 
an existing state the right to secede. It however found that international law did not 
generally prohibit declarations of independence.57 
 
 No matter how one looks at the Crimean situation, the parallels with Kosovo are 
inescapable. By citing the independence of Kosovo, Putin and his diplomats, rightly or 
wrongly, have managed to turn the tables on the West and come up with a convincing 
legal explanation for Russia’s own foreign policies. Howard argues that actually, 
America’s own position until February 1992 was to support other states’ territorial 
integrity, but this view changed 180 degrees when Yugoslavia broke up, and supporting 
“self-determination” came into vogue. As for Russia’s recognition of Crimean 
independence being too hasty, “The quick time recognition by the United States of 
Kosovo’s independence within 24 hours of that secessionist move doesn’t support the 
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spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, and conjures up the similarly quick recognition of the 
new state of Panama by the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.”58 
 Can a region of one country peacefully and legally secede and become part of 
another country? The answer is, it depends. Just what are the examples of such land 
transfers? In the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (The “Velvet Divorce”) – the 
split was accomplished without consent of the people of either country; no referendum of 
any kind on this issue was ever held.59 “According to polls, the majority did not want to 
split up, and also did want a referendum on this question.”60 According to contemporary 
polls, only about a third of the people in either republic favored dissolution. In the end, 
many experienced the “phantom limb effect.” 
 A much more bloody and drawn out affair was the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 
early nineteen nineties. Perhaps the bloodiest breakup of them all – the partitioning of 
India in the last days of the British rule, and the creation of Pakistan (which itself would 
later get partitioned to give birth to Bangladesh) involved borders drawn at at neck-
breaking speed, and ethnic strife that caused millions of deaths. To the above examples 
may be added several other, still ongoing debates over the Catalan independence in 
Spain, or the division of Belgium into the Dutch- and French-speaking halves, or 
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independence of Scotland from the United Kingdom, but they are beyond the scope of 
this research. 
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XVIII.  
The Legal Aspects 
 
 One could find a list of peaceful land transfers throughout recent history, some 
peaceful, some not, yet conducted with the will of the majority of people living on that 
land. After all of the above examples of independence achieved, we come to the the most 
telling example of all – namely, Ukraine itself becoming independent from USSR in 
1991. Which brings us to the crux of the current problem: having voted for its own 
independence from Moscow’s rule back in 1991, and given an opportunity to become 
independent without a shot fired, Ukraine has no moral right to prevent others from 
seeking independence from itself. “For example, if Crimea successfully gained 
independence from Ukraine, which originally separated from Russia, this can be seen as 
an example of second-order secession.”61 
 After examining these aspects, a conclusion may be drawn that, as far as the 
international law goes, Ukraine may be in the right legally, or at least has more rights to 
Crimea than Russia. As far as the will of the people actually living there is concerned, it 
came into the Russian possession because the overwhelming majority of Crimeans 
wanted so. Every opinion poll conducted on the peninsula supports this. Unfortunately 
for “overwhelming majorities,” they do not constitute the United Nations and do not have 
authority to draw nations’ borders. 
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Losers do not have the chance to win back through election. And a minority has no 
chance to rule in a multinational state. People have no right to “renew” their contract with 
the constitution, nor do they have the right to redefine national boundaries.62 
 
 All of which raises a question: was the Crimean referendum on independence 
legal? The answer is again: it depends. 
“The answer depends on what your perspective is,” said David Rothkopf, editor of 
Foreign Policy magazine. “The U.S. is buying into the argument of the Ukraine 
government, which is that the secession of Crimea from Ukraine is not constitutional 
under the terms of the Ukrainian constitution,” Rothkopf said. "The alternative argument 
is that all peoples have a right of self-determination and that if the people of Crimea 
choose not to be part of Ukraine, that is their prerogative in the same way that it was the 
choice of colonial powers to break away from the imperial powers that claimed them or 
parts of the former Yugoslavia were free to head off on their own," he added.63 
 
 To begin with, for a secession to be legal, the laws of the mother country must 
allow it. Most countries’ laws do not permit it. Natalia Cwicinskaja of the Adam 
Mickiewicz University notes that “the prohibition in the Constitution of Ukraine against 
holding a referendum on secession is not contrary to international law. The majority of 
the world’s sovereign states do not recognize any right of secession in their 
constitutions.”64 Even in those states that allow it, becoming independent is normally held 
to legally require the consent of the parent state. John Balouziyeh argues that “the 
Ukrainian Constitution does not contemplate the secession of territories, and where 
referendums are contemplated, they must be organized on a national, not regional, level. 
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The Crimea referendum therefore lacks a proper Ukrainian legal basis.”65 Meaning, even 
legally, Crimea could never hope to separate itself from Ukraine as long as the majority 
of Ukrainians voted against such action. America’s own Revolutionary and Civil War 
experience proves that a drive for independence can be a bloody affair without a 
guarantee of success, even though in the latter case, US constitution neither allows nor 
prohibits secession, therefore making the legal aspect of that issue moot. In Ukraine’s 
case, any threat to the country’s territorial integrity was met with government’s 
disapproval and hostility, and it acted again and again against the wishes of those who 
questioned it. 
 The opinion of legal experts on the issue varies. The Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law dances around the issue by stating that there is no 
legal precedent for a unilateral independence, such as with cases of Kosovo 
(successfully) separating itself from Serbia or Quebec (unsuccessfully) attempting to 
separate itself from Canada: 
A right to unilateral secession can be defined as a right of a minority-people to separate a 
part of the territory of the parent State on the basis of that people’s right to self-
determination. However, as it follows from the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (International Court of Justice) and the Quebec case 
(Supreme Court of Canada), in modern international law unilateral secession of “sub-
states” is neither prohibited nor allowed.66 
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 The author, a Ukrainian jurist Anna Stepanowa quotes the following 
circumstances in which a unilateral secession may be considered legal under the 
international law: 
 (1) it shall concern people in territories that are subject to decolonization; (2) it shall be 
envisaged by the national legislation of the parent state concerned; (3) the territory 
inhabited by a certain people should be occupied or annexed after 1945; (4) the 
secessionists shall be “a people”; (5) their parent state shall flagrantly violate their human 
rights and (6) no other effective remedies under national or international law may exist, if 
any of these conditions are met.67 
 
 Although the author claims that none of the above apply in Crimea’s case, this is 
debatable. Crimea may not be a “colony” in the usual sense of the word, but it was 
conquered and “colonized” by the Russian Empire in the 1700s, just as the rest of the 
world was being colonized by European powers. Its territory is inhabited by “a certain 
people” whose land was transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 without their assent, 
and then became part of an independent state in 1991. These “people” have no history of 
being part of Ukraine (itself a largely notional entity before 1991) before 1954 and 
repeatedly displayed their displeasure with being such. As for the issue of “human 
rights,” a lot depends on the question of the language laws mandated by the Ukrainian 
government. 
 Marc Weller of the University of Cambridge argues that the “international 
practice generally seeks to accommodate separatist demands within the existing territorial 
boundaries.”68 The problem of course is that Crimea was not governed by “international 
practice” but by the Ukrainian government, which did not accommodate any “separatist 
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demands” of the people who live there. Anne Peters adds that even Ukraine’s own 
constitution is irrelevant in this case because “from an international law perspective, the 
constitutional admissibility or inadmissibility of the referendum is irrelevant.”69 Meaning, 
even if secession were legal under Ukrainian law, it would still not be guaranteed. 
 Unlike many comparing the Crimea situation to that of Kosovo, Jure Vidmar of 
the European Journal Cyprus argues that it actually has more in common with Cyprus. 
The problem is not so much with a territory demanding independence, but with an 
outside power (Turkey in Northern Cyprus’ case, or Russia in Crimea’s) assisting with 
independence. The international law itself is actually neither here nor there of the subject. 
It falls on the other countries to recognize a newly independent land as a “nation” – 
which most countries are reluctant to do not to damage relations with the parent state and 
for fear of their own secessionist movements. Vidmar wrote: 
Groups seeking independence usually present self-determination as an absolute 
entitlement. Conversely, states countering secession usually present territorial integrity as 
an absolute entitlement of states. Neither camp is right. As follows from the General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law (GA Res 2625), the Quebec 
case (Supreme Court of Canada) and partly also from the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
(ICJ), international law is actually neutral on the question of unilateral secession.70 
 
 James Crawford adds that “the position is that secession is neither legal nor illegal 
in international law, but a legally neutral act the consequences of which are regulated 
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internationally”71 – meaning, international law may not have an opinion, but nations do. 
As Cwicinskaja puts it: “to take effect in international law, secession should be 
recognized by the international community.”72 
 On the other hand, even where the right of secession is recognized by the mother 
country, it is not a given, even if the majority has voted for it in a democratic referendum. 
In case of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a vote in favor simply 
compels the two sides to “negotiate” on the future status of the country; independence for 
separatists is not guaranteed. And the Canadian Parliament then adopted a “clarity bill” 
further constraining future referenda. Thus, even if every single person in the land voted 
to secede, it would still be illegal. Rebecca Lowe of the International Bar Association 
went as far as stating that the result of any referendum or the will of the Crimean people 
“doesn’t matter.”73 Brilmayer adds that independence and annexation “cannot be justified 
by a referendum about the preferences of those who live in Crimea today.”74 
It’s a matter of international law: territory cannot be annexed simply because the people 
who happen to be living there today want to secede. If that were the case, then under 
international law, any geographically cohesive group could vote on independence. That 
would mean the Basques should be free from Spain and France, and the Kurds would 
have an independent nation; the large community of Cubans living in Miami could vote 
to separate from the United States.  
 If a referendum were the right way to decide these issues, Russia ought to be 
holding a referendum to determine the future of Chechnya. Of course, it isn’t. 
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 International law is unambiguous on how countries should decide the fate of 
disputed territories like Crimea. Countries can acquire territory by discovering 
uninhabited land, signing a treaty – as with Khrushchev’s transfer of Crimea to Ukraine 
in 1954 – or occupying an area peacefully over a long period of time. The legal methods 
for resolving questions of sovereignty are founded on widely recognized principles of 
international law. These do not include, and have never included, a simple referendum of 
people living in a contested territory. That is why every successful secessionist 
movement has founded its claim on legal entitlement to the territory that they seek to 
“liberate”. 
 
 The fact that the Kurds have lived in a de facto independent nation since 1991 
(regardless of what the Baker Commission has decreed on this subject) seems of no 
concern to Brilmayer. Or the fact that, unlike the 2014 Referendum, however flawed, 
Khrushchev’s transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine was not a “treaty” in any normal 
sense of the word, but a decree of the communist government without any regard to the 
wishes of the people who lived there, and was not a “transfer” of the territory between 
two sovereign states, but rather two constituent regions of the same nation (the Soviet 
Union.) 
 The legal opinions can be summed up thus: 
Source Opinion on the referendum 
Anna Stepanowa, 
Cambridge Journal of 
International and 
Comparative Law 
Illegal although there is no precedent either way75 
Marc Weller, University 
of Cambridge 
Illegal because previously “Russia has clearly and 
unambiguously recognised [sic] Ukraine and its present 
borders” Crimean legislature has no authority to undermine 
Ukrainian law.76 
David Rothkopf, Foreign “Depends on your perspective”77 
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Policy Magazine 
Chrisella Herzog, 
Diplomatic Courier Political legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder
78 
Stefan Soesanto, Center 
for Strategic and 
International Studies 
May be legal because Ukraine’s interim government itself is 
illegitimate79 
John Balouziyeh, Lexis 
Nexis 
“arguably illegitimate” “lacks a proper Ukrainian legal basis” 
“international law has little to say as to the legality of 
political referendums for independence. The International 
Court of Justice, in its 2010 Advisory opinion on Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, held that a unilateral declaration 
of independence is not a per se violation of international 
law.”80 
OSCE High 
Commissioner on 
National Minorities 
No opinion. “All decisions on essential issues, such as the 
status of Crimea, language policy or national minority policy, 
must be taken in dialogue with all parties and be consistent 
with international law”81 
William W. Burke-
White, University of 
Pennsylvania Law 
School 
“Russia is taking a card straight from America’s playbook.” 
“while in 1999 the US was able to control the interpretation 
and enforcement of international law to secure Kosovo’s 
independence without legal consequence, Washington finds 
itself in 2014 unable to fully counteract Moscow’s legal 
argument that its support for, and ultimate annexation of, 
Crimea is equally grounded in international law.”82 
Euan Murray, 
Academia.edu 
“a matter for debate” “even if Russia was advocating 
humanitarian intervention, it has no basis in either the United 
Nations Charter or customary international law, which would 
render the use of force incompatible with the UN Charter” 
“Although not expressly made legal by the UN Charter, it has 
come to be accepted that States may, in principle, use force 
within the territory of another State if they have received an 
invitation to do so.” “the Russian use of force in Crimea, 
although potentially legitimate, will not be in accordance 
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with self-defence and the UN Charter.” “whether Russia’s 
part in the Crimean Crisis actually constitutes aggression is 
questionable”83 
The Economist 
Neither here nor there. “International law does not recognise 
a right to secede per se, but it also steers clear of prohibiting 
unilateral declarations of independence. International legal 
bodies regard the result of successful break-ups the way 
friends see a separating couple: as two newly unlinked 
individuals, like it or not.”84 
Lea Brilmayer, The 
Guardian 
Illegal. “the referendum seems inconsistent with the 
Ukrainian constitution, which says all Ukrainians would have 
to vote on Crimea’s secession” “the Russian proposal is 
based on an outdated theory of secession” “Using principles 
of self-determination to justify imposing ethnic homogeneity 
has resulted in genocide and ethnic cleansing.”85 
Rebecca Lowe, 
International Bar 
Association 
Illegal. “no justification for the annexation of the province 
under international law” “It doesn’t matter what the result of 
the so-called referendum was, or what the will of the 
Crimean people may have been.” “Under the Ukraine 
Constitution it is possible for a region to seek self-
determination, but only through a national referendum.”86 
Himanil Raina, 
International Policy 
Digest 
May be legal. “Article 12 of the Ukraine-Russia Friendship 
Treaty which specifically requires the protection of Russian 
origin ethnic minorities provides Moscow with some legal 
cover for its actions. Ukraine can block Crimean actions if 
they contravene Ukrainian law.” However, the legitimacy of 
Ukraine’s current authorities itself is in question. “There is no 
prohibition on unilateral declarations of independence as 
made clear by the International Court of Justice in its 
advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence.”87 
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Ashley Deeks, New 
Republic 
May be legal. “two recurrent themes in ‘use of force’ law: 
That many of its concepts remain malleable on paper, and 
that certain forcible actions fall within the core 
understandings of those concepts, such that most credible 
observers would agree that those actions violate international 
law.”88 Russia used force, but “using force” is not the same 
as “armed attack” – therefore Ukraine cannot play victim. 
Anton Moiseienko, 
Opinio Juris 
Illegal. “Russia’s annexation of Crimea raises serious 
questions of compliance with international law”89 
Julian Ku, Opinio Juris 
Neutral. “the ICJ found (among other things) that general 
international law does not prohibit unilateral declarations of 
independence”90 
Robert McCorquodale, 
Opinio Juris 
Illegal. “It is not unlawful for it to have a referendum and 
declare itself independent (or that it wishes to merge with 
Russia), as this was allowed by the International Court of 
Justice in its (poorly reasoned) advisory opinion on the 
declaration of independence by Kosovo. However, such a 
declaration of independence or merging is not effective in 
international law by itself.” “there can be no international 
legal effect of any independence or merger declaration that 
might arise from a referendum”91 
Benjamin J. Rhodes, 
President Obama’s 
deputy national security 
adviser 
Probably illegal. “apples and oranges” “You can’t ignore the 
context that this is taking place days after the violation of 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. It’s not a 
permissive environment for people to make up their own 
minds.”92 
Dimitri K. Simes, 
president of the Center 
for the National Interest 
May be legal. “Kosovo is very much a legitimate precedent” 
“Independence was accomplished despite strong opposition 
by a legitimate, democratic and basically Western-oriented 
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government of Serbia.” By contrast, the new Kiev 
government “lacks legitimacy”93 
Samuel Charap, 
International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 
Neither here nor there. “No state has been consistent in its 
application of this” [views on independence]94 
Anne Peters, Social 
Science Research Project 
Illegal. “the referendum was not free and fair, and could not 
form a basis for the alteration of Crimea’s territorial status.” 
“What happened with Crimea is probably best qualified as a 
seizure of territory under threat of force, i.e. as an unlawful 
annexation.” “holding a free and fair referendum is only a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a territorial 
realignment to be accepted as lawful by international law.”95 
Chris Borgen, Opinio 
Juris 
Illegal. “The legal issue here is really one of Ukrainian 
Constitutional law more than of international law, because, as 
it is generally understood, there is no right to secede under 
international law. Under international law, a secession is 
neither a right nor necessarily illegal. It is treated as a fact: a 
secession either was successful, it was not, or it is still being 
contested.” “The only place that could confer a right to 
Crimea to leave by referendum is the Ukrainian 
Constitution.” “there is no mention of secession”96 
John B. Bellinger III, 
Council on Foreign 
Relations 
Illegal. “the March 16 vote violates both the Ukrainian 
constitution and general principles of international law, 
which respect the territorial integrity of states” “Russia may 
find that its support for Crimea's independence might trigger 
referenda or secession movements that it opposes, such as in 
Chechnya” “International law prefers to preserve the 
territorial integrity of states and limit the right of popular 
self-determination because minority secession movements, if 
allowed to proceed without limits, do not reflect the views of 
the majority in a state and could lead to the breakdown of the 
international system”97 
Charles Krauthammer, Illegal. “Russia cannot rewrite Ukraine’s frontiers at will” 
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Commentary “the last official international borders constitute the new 
boundary lines” “this principle applies in full when the old 
borders were colonial or otherwise undemocratically 
imposed. If it were not so, new countries would be born with 
all their borders in dispute, and endless frontier conflicts 
between neighbors would ensue”98 
René Värk, Diplomaatia 
Illegal because outside force was used. “The right of self-
determination has conditions and most certainly does not 
represent an absolute entitlement, permitting the people to 
unilaterally secede from the “parent State” at any time and 
without paying attention to the interest of the parent State. 
(…) Secession is neither a right nor necessarily a breach 
under international law. It is treated as a fact, i.e. secession is 
successful or fails. The success depends of political 
recognition by States — if the seceding State gains enough 
international recognition, it gains gradually legitimacy and 
finally statehood. In practice, secession is generally 
disfavoured. (…) [The] declaration of independence does not 
violate international law. [But] the referendum and 
declaration of independence in Crimea would have been 
impossible without the support from Russian forces.”99 
Olexandr Zadorozhny, 
European Political and 
Law Discourse 
Illegal. “clear violation of international law” “the events of 
the Crimea crisis cannot be justified by international law” 
“the Russian actions in Crimea constitute a breach of 
international law and cannot be justified”100 
Jure Vidmar, European 
Journal of International 
Law 
“while the referendum itself was not illegal in international 
law, the shift of territorial sovereignty would be illegal”101 
Natalia Cwicinskaja, 
Polish Yearbook of 
International Law 
Illegal if only because too hasty. “inconsistent with 
international law” “under international law, when a state 
recognizes the seceding unit prematurely such recognition 
has been considered to constitute an illegal act” 
“International law does not provide any legal definition of 
‘secession’” “the concept of secession is not a subject of 
agreement among legal scholars” “international law neither 
authorizes nor prohibits secession” “to take effect in 
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international law, secession should be recognized by the 
international community” “the principle of territorial integrity 
is the overriding principle, and secession without the consent 
of the “home” state remains illegal”102 
Robin Geiss, 
International Law 
Studies 
Illegal. “wholly inconceivable” “even if there had been a 
legal basis for a territorial status alteration of Crimea, the fact 
that it was brought about by, and is inseparably linked to, an 
unlawful use of force renders it null and void”103 
Roy Allison, Thomas 
Grant, Philip Leach, and 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 
Chatham House 
Illegal. “difficult to find a legal basis justifying Russia’s 
actions in Crimea” “even if it were to be assumed that the 
intervention in Kosovo was a breach of international law, the 
argument that Russia could therefore commit such a breach 
was not a legal argument, but a political one”104 
Wendy Zeldin, Global 
Legal Monitor No opinion, just a re-statement of UN resolutions.
105 
Zhandos Kuderin, 
Michigan Journal of 
International Law 
Neutral. “the Crimean situation seems to present a different 
beast: a clear-cut geopolitical interest. Any action by the 
Security Council would be compromised by Russian 
interests. Thus, even if the Security Council does take 
measures in relation to Crimea, can Ukraine refuse to abide 
by them and continue exercising self-defense? The Charter 
suggests that it would be a violation of international law and 
Ukraine might get labeled as an aggressor and subject to 
sanctions.” “a dangerous reversion to a realist thinking in 
international law”106 
Lawrence A. Howard, 
New English Review 
“the Ukrainian Constitution recognized that the people were 
sovereign” “therefore if the people of Crimea 
overwhelmingly support merger with Russia, that is their 
legitimate right” “Neither the G-7 statement nor official US 
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objections have dealt directly with the Crimean electorate’s 
right to self-determination except to reject the legitimacy of 
the referendum.” “Compared with the two American 
“humanitarian” interventions, there is nothing remarkable or 
notably illegal about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
annexation of Crimea.”107 
Barry Kellman, DePaul 
University 
Illegal. “The problem, from Russia's standpoint, is with 
recognition.” “any arguments emerging from Moscow about 
Russian law in the days ahead are irrelevant under 
international law”108 
Yuval Shany, Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 
Uncertain. “the combined effect of the international response 
to Crimea and Kosovo throws international law on self-
determination into a state of uncertainty, threatening the 
stability of the existing state system” “the legal relationship 
between the right to self-determination and the principle of 
territorial integrity of existing states is in flux”109 
Milena Sterio, 
IntLawGrrls 
Probably illegal. “international law does not positively 
recognize the right for groups to separate from their mother 
states” “no positive right to secession exists within 
international law” “we need to step back and analyze the 
region’s history, as well as to take into account its 
population’s true desires”110 
OSCE Permanent 
Council 
“illegal and illegitimate” “subsequent illegal annexation” “act 
of violation of international law”111 
UN Security Council 
resolution 
Illegal. “having no legal validity”112 “failed to adopt any 
decision due to Russia’s veto”113 
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UN General Assembly 
Illegal. UN Member States “not recognise any alteration in 
the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”114 “the 
referendum and the subsequent decisions of the self-
proclaimed Crimean authorities and the decision-makers of 
the Russian Federation are illegal”115 
 
 From analyzing the above opinions, a curious consensus emerges, consisting of 
the following points: 
1. The referendum is clearly illegal, because 
2. There is no legal precedent in international law supporting unilateral secession, 
although 
3. There is no legal precedent prohibiting it either, but 
4. The referendum is illegal anyway. 
 Virtually all Western (or at least English-speaking) analysts declare the 2014 
referendum illegal under international law, even though most of them also admit that 
there is no legal precedent to support or overturn such a verdict. This admission brings us 
to the ultimate answer – without a clear legal precedent in international law, Crimea’s 
independence from Ukraine was no more or no less legal than Ukraine’s own 
independence from the Soviet Union twenty-three years prior. According to the US 
Written Statement on Kosovo submitted to the UN International Court: “Declarations of 
independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not 
make them violations of international law.” The Crimean referendum and the subsequent 
annexation of the peninsula by Russia was perhaps “illegal but legitimate.” As the 
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Economist put it shortly before the referendum: “if Russian-speakers in Crimea (which 
already has the status as an ‘autonomous republic’) vote to slice themselves off from 
Ukraine next week and throw themselves into the arms of the Russian Federation, no 
international court will raise much of a fuss—but neither would one take pains to defend 
the peninsula's right to secede.”116 Meaning, the “international law” everyone keeps 
referring to is neither here nor there on the issue. 
 This however does not address the issue of the referendum not having an option 
of staying within Ukraine without an autonomy. Yet the fact that the overwhelming 
majority chose independence makes this point somewhat, if not entirely, moot ex post 
facto, because few voters would choose such an option anyway. 
 Throughout the two decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Kremlin authorities (and to an extent, Russian people in general) observed with worry the 
gradual movement of Eastern European states into the military orbit of the West, with the 
subsequent membership in NATO and EU. The first to go were the former members of 
the Warsaw Pact; three former republics of USSR itself, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
were soon to follow. Form the strategic point of view, this eliminated the “buffer zone” 
between Moscow and the West, which the Soviets had acquired as a result of the Second 
World War. That Russia would not object to these countries becoming democracies was 
not in doubt, inasmuch as, Russia itself insisted it was on the road to democracy. 
However, facing a phalanx of nations whose military posture was not in tune with 
Moscow raised a specter of historic threats the West had posed over the centuries. With 
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the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, already in NATO, there remained 
only three neutral nations between Russia and the West: Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. 
Moldova was kept in check by the separatist enclave of Transnistria, whose independence 
no country in the world would recognize, but which housed a contingent of Russian 
troops, posed to protect it in case the frozen conflict were to flare up. This unsettled 
dispute effectively kept the otherwise pro-Western Moldova from joining NATO, 
because the alliance would not accept new members with unsettled borders. (Although it 
did not prevent the Moldovan elite from seeking the membership in the EU.) Belarus was 
kept in Moscow’s orbit by Putin’s support of its pro-Russian dictator, Lukashenko, thus 
making that country “the last dictatorship in Europe” in the words of many 
commentators. Ukraine, the biggest of the three, was left as the only viable battleground 
up for grabs. 
 Since its independence in 1991, the politics of Ukraine was characterized by the 
struggle between eastern and western halves voting to elect the central government 
representing their respective interests. The to-and-fro between pro-Russian and pro-
Western parties continued for the first two decades after independence, with neither side 
managing to seize lasting control over the country’s politics. Eventually, this struggle 
culminated in Ukrainians taking to the streets of Kiev in late 2013 in protests against the 
(then) pro-Russian president Yanukovich, over his refusal to sign an association 
agreement with the European Union. The original protest, which started over the issue of 
police brutality, soon evolved into a revolt against a corrupt administration. However, 
both the West and the pro-Western Ukrainians soon saw this protest as an opportunity to 
replace the pro-Russian administration with a pro-Western one. A new “Orange 
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Revolution” was too much for the Kremlin, but it in itself might have not been enough to 
cause Russia’s soon violent involvement in Ukraine. What finally pushed Putin over the 
edge was apparently the fear of a supposed US plan for the establishment of an American 
naval base in Crimea, a proposal that might have never been real,117 but the possibility of 
which, however remote, Putin could never risk to entertain. He said as much himself.118 
Whether US was really planning to open a base on the peninsula is debatable, but the 
steady advance of NATO deployments in the last twenty five years closer to Russia’s 
borders is indisputable. Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, NATO has enlarged from sixteen members to twenty eight, with plans for 
more to join. Whereas twenty-five years ago, Kremlin had troops stationed on the Elbe in 
the middle of Europe, today the NATO borders have shifted four hundred miles to the 
East, some sixty miles away from St. Petersburg. Such strategic imbalance cannot but 
make a lot of people in Russia and its political establishment nervous. 
 On February 10, 2007, Putin gave a famous speech at the 43rd Munich 
Conference on Security Policy, where he reiterated Russia’s security concerns about 
NATO moving its bases up to Russian borders: 
The so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It 
turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to 
strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all.  
 I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the 
modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, 
it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the 
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right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the 
assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where 
are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to 
remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General 
Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: "the fact that 
we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet 
Union a firm security guarantee". Where are these guarantees?119 
 
 Putin clearly understands that the European Union, long dependent on the US for 
its security and on Russia for its energy, is unwilling to engage in conflict with Moscow 
over what it considers a periphery of Europe, worthy of neither a security deal nor 
economic cooperation. He also knows that, after two inconclusive wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the American public is weary of “foreign entanglements,” and support for 
any new foreign involvement is low. Americans have long born the lion’s share of NATO 
defense spending, and have long been asking Europeans to increase their financial 
commitment to security, a request that, in view of the current economic recession, is only 
apt to grow louder in the near future. 
 Putin’s policies in Ukraine and other countries surrounding Russia follow in the 
footsteps of his Soviet and Imperial Russian predecessors – not to allow unfriendly 
powers to emerge on the borders or, at least maintain a buffer zone between them and 
Russia. How can Putin contain the West? In the case of East Ukraine, he is attempting to 
salvage whatever minimum “buffer” he can. Giving Crimea back to Ukraine is politically 
impossible at this point. At the other extreme is the possibility of Putin ordering his 
troops to invade and take over the whole of Ukraine. This is dangerous, but not likely. He 
understands that much of Ukraine’s population does not wish to go back under Moscow’s 
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rule, and doing so by force would only create armed resistance and swing the world 
opinion against Russia. In the end, his rule depends on his popularity at home, and this 
popularity at the moment depends on his foreign policy. It’s likely that he will stand pat 
and support the insurgency in the Eastern Ukraine for as long as possible, while not 
resorting to open aggression. After a century of border changes, the demarcation line 
between the West and Russia may end up where it was a hundred years ago – between 
Minsk and Pinsk. 
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XIX.  
Conclusion 
 
 What to do about Crimea? Various options have been proposed on what to do 
about the situation. All of them have one serious limitation – they presume a compromise 
(like “Finlandizing” the country) is possible. With war raging in the eastern regions of the 
country, and with both the West and Russian threatening each other with the ever-
expanding list of economic sanctions, it is far from certain that both sides can sufficiently 
trust each other to agree on some kind of middle ground. More likely, Ukraine is doomed 
to be divided into “spheres of influence.” The much touted idea of bringing Ukraine into 
NATO is not feasible for a very simple reason – the organization has a strict rule not to 
accept new members with unsettled borders. Which presents the alliance with a dilemma: 
it cannot bring Ukraine into the fold as long as it recognizes Crimea as part of sovereign 
Ukrainian territory. But short of the Ukrainian army’s reconquering the peninsula by 
force, the only way for Ukraine to join NATO is, ironically, by acceding to the loss of 
Crimea, and thus consenting to Russia’s actions regarding it. 
 There appear to be four possible outcomes of the present situation. One is for the 
Kiev government, after securing foreign military aid, to mount a successful invasion of 
Crimea and take it back by force. This is the least likely scenario. Given that Ukrainian 
military currently struggles to contain the separatist rebellion in the two regions in the 
east of the country, it is doubtful any action will be taken against Crimea. If it does 
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happen, it would lead to an outright war between Russia and Ukraine, a war the latter side 
is unlikely to win, and a war that can only lead to a greater partitioning of Ukraine. 
 The second option is that Ukraine (and by extension, most of the rest of the 
world) accepts the loss of Crimea as a fait accompli, recognizes it as part of Russia, and 
moves on. Some argue that the European opinion has in fact already moved on.120 
However, this is also very unlikely because, with few exceptions, countries do not part 
with their constituent lands easily. And with the world opinion behind it, Kiev is not 
likely to budge, whatever the real situation on the ground. 
A somewhat more likely scenario is both sides accepting the status quo, and 
accepting the situation as is without any diplomatic recognition. Both sides stop fighting, 
the ceasefire holds, and Ukraine will be effectively partitioned. In this case, Crimea is 
bound to be seen by the international community as part of Ukraine in all but a name for 
decades to come. How and when it may become part of Russia de jure is unknown. If the 
past is any indication, disputed national borders sometimes take decades to settle. 
Germany’s eastern border was not legally settled until 1990, forty-five years after the end 
of WWII. Six decades after the Korean War, that country continues to be divided. Taiwan 
exists in a political limbo with an ambiguous sovereign status. Such an outcome may be 
the lesser evil for everyone as long as peace holds. 
 A more dangerous, but also the most likely scenario is the conflict in Ukraine 
continuing for years. This is also not without precedent. Separatist conflicts have a 
tendency to simmer for decades, not just years. Civil wars in Sri Lanka and the 
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Philippines dragged on for the better part of the twentieth century. Russia’s own 
protracted struggle with Muslim insurgency in Caucasus is a good example. The fear of 
losing more land is a good reason for Ukraine not to give up fighting, lest newer 
independent entities start emerging, threatening to destroy the country completely. 
Crimea will probably escape the carnage, but the two enclaves in the east of the country, 
Luhansk and Donetsk, will continue to suffer from the protracted conflict. The difference 
between the last two outcomes effectively means the difference between peace and war. 
Either way, Ukraine is bound to be a divided country for years to come. 
 There is an option of bringing Ukraine (whatever is left of it, that is) into the EU, 
but the EU is not a military alliance, and cannot protect it in case of war. As Eugene 
Rumer predicted over two decades ago: 
If Russia becomes hostile to the West, Ukraine will probably fall back into Moscow’s 
orbit; the task of propping up weak Ukraine against a hostile and xenophobic Russia will 
be beyond the military and financial capabilities of the Western alliance. (…) A Russian-
Ukrainian conflict arising from a crisis in Crimea, such as the one that took place in May 
of 1994, would endanger Russia’s already difficult reforms, destroy the weak remaining 
chances for the survival of independent Ukraine, and push Russia on the path of re-
expansion in defense of an illegitimate secessionist movement created by domestic 
stagnation in Ukraine. 
 The choices facing Western policymakers in that case would be extraordinarily 
unpleasant.121 
 
 Graham Allison of the Harvard Kennedy School opines that the Ukraine scenario 
could replay in the other former Soviet republics that have sizeable ethnic Russian 
minorities, including the three Baltic nations that are members of NATO. If they get 
embroiled in a war with Russian separatists, Putin might send in his troops to protect 
them. Such a move would invoke the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, demanding 
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US and other member states to come to the Baltics’ defense, effectively starting a war 
with nuclear Russia. “But will German troops come to Latvia’s rescue? And if they did, 
would a majority of Germans support that action? Would the French, or British? Would 
Americans?” But if the US does not come to help it would destroy the American 
credibility to the extent from which it would never recover. It would set off a chain 
reaction of distrust among the nations currently under the US “security umbrella” 
throughout the world: Japan, South Korea, etc. – a security pact that has been in place 
since the end of the Second World War. The most viable solution, Allison believes, is to 
find a compromise for Ukraine becoming a neutral state. 
 I have analyzed the political history of Crimea between the dissolution of USSR 
and its becoming independent from Ukraine, attempting to understand the opinions of the 
people living on the peninsula, and whether the electoral history of that region can 
explain and possibly justify its independence. The emphasis was made on the elections 
and referendums, as well as various legal agreements made by various powers. Although 
the Ukrainian conflict does not seem to be over, the extensive media coverage can give a 
relatively accurate picture of various parties’ opinions and political aspirations. 
 Given the uncertainty of the still-ongoing war in Ukraine, it would be impossible 
to predict the course of the future events. However, significant body of research does 
exist to give a glimpse of public opinion in various parts of the country, which allows us 
to understand how different actors of this drama see the conflict, and how they may 
attempt to act in the near future. 
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